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So the city statemetaphor highlights key distinguishing features of autonomyandauthoritywhich have strength-
ened London's distinctive identity in the last thirty years and made its relation to the national host increasingly
problematic (Ertürk et al., 2011, p. 7).
1 INTRODUCTION: THE POLITICAL PROBLEM
Over the last 30 years of strategic reconfiguration in the British state, we have become confronted with an interna-
tional revanchist capitalist class across the core states of the world system, and a resurgent domestic metropolitan
power, in a manner that is markedly historical, geographical, and political. If we are to contemplate new emancipa-
tory trajectories, this reconfiguration calls for urgent reconceptualization not only of the “inherited metageographical
assumptions” of urban sociology (Brenner & Schmid, 2017, p. 187), but also of the social relations that constitute the
new conditions of existence in our state-territory. So, what is this new condition?
The Conservative Party's rehashing of the One-Nation Britain slogan seems to bear no relation to the country
we actually inhabit (Elliott, 2013), with the recent EU referendum result symptomatizing the widening cleavages left
by Austerity and a generation of neoliberalization. The dominance of the City of London has hollowed out industry
across the country (Jessop, 1994), and has contracted the social skill base (Elliott, 2011), with “generally negative
macroeconomic effects on the state territory as a whole” (Agnew, 2005, p. 444). A new generation of boosterish
buildings that pepper the world's greatest tax haven has turned our seat of government into “a pastiche of the Gulf
economy” (Jenkins, 2013) and has made a mockery of the calls for Austerity. British government seems now to cater
for the febrile advantage of financiers, mediacrats, and property spivs avant le deluge, culturally reinforced by an
echeloned cadre of ideological apologists of pan-global provenance, whose social, cultural, and political orientations
“now link them to other financial centres than to their nominal home states” (Agnew, 2005, p. 444).
It is the dominant liberal discourse of the “city,” which assumes London to be a place of productive potency and
wealth creation, that I want fundamentally to reconsider as a political apologetic for the domination of metropolitan
power positionalities that rather appropriate, command, and dispose the disbursements of capital. As such, it has
been forgotten in these discourses that the classical city-state was built on hierarchy, exploitation, slavery, leisure, a
profoundly ambiguous and contested imagined community, and a brutal disregard for individual human life (Anderson,
2013, pp. 21–22; Long, 1972, p. 26). The class politics of the city-state differ quite considerably from those of industrial
production across the national territory. The mysterious osmosis of trickle-down economics, putatively centrifugal,
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and an inflated sense of their own indispensability on the part of an insular dominant class, flow into a projected image
of London as the national breadwinner, the primum movens, the “powerhouse of the UK economy” (Pickford, 2013,
p. 2). It is as though the heroic age of capitalism has returned, but what is patent is how crypto-feudal our society has
actually become. So, to undermine this productivist vision I suggest using terms that aremore germane to an oligarchic
or even aristocratic metropolitan power: appropriation, dispossession, rent, enclosure, toll, domination, extraction,
hierarchy, trap, waste, levy, immobility, tribute, anti-production, and dissipation. Laying out how the dominant liberal
vision has become politically reactionary is the task ahead. We must calibrate our critical crosshairs once again at a
territorialized property power and not simply allow our energy to be diverted into the “insipid humanism” that fixates
onmanaging poverty from the post-national hub (Harvey, 2015, p. 285–293). Briefly stated, in the newly territorialized
political economy of what I shall call, the axiomatic city-state,1 we must rediscover the political form of class struggle
and counter conduct that has begun to emerge from the changing constellation of social forces in the spatio-temporal
particularity of the British polity, and ask ourselves what we are going to do about it.
In critical and democratic theory it has become politically exigent to penetrate analytically the formation and oper-
ation of this metropolitan oligarchy by focusing on more than a mere cabal of bankers and politicians who control the
principal organs of executive decision-making, and to think beyond the City as the source of all our woes. A cultural
and ideological pseudo-cosmopolitan elite beyond conventional delimitation buttresses the financial interest through
theirmanipulationof thenewmetropolitanpositionalities of surplus appropriation. Theyare implicated in anexpanded
notion of financialization that is semiotic and territorial. Despite their nominally progressive politics, and internation-
alist leanings, they are metropolitan agents of global capital as a new urban oligarchy,2 and as such are constitutive
fractions of the international capitalist class.
What is now necessary is to engage in some imaginative and critical thinking on how and why London-UK, as an
assemblage of social relations that goes way beyond the conventionally understood geographical expression, consti-
tutes a spatio-temporal ligature that mediates the British state-territory in the world system. We must acknowledge
that there is something in the character of this assemblage that facilitates the emplacement of positionalities of appro-
priation, and how it has become generative of new constellations of class. Most important of all, we must foreground
the contradictions in the dominant liberal ideology of the city, and in so doing shed light on the path to servitude, dom-
ination, dispossession, and enforced inertia that is the chronic reality for those of us unfortunate enough to have been
born into parochial obscurity.
The obviousness and clarity with which these developments strike those who live in Britain today is only equalled
at present by a baffled confusion over the course of recent events. These evental features of British politics symptom-
atize the developmental conjoncture (in the Annales sense of the term),3 about which this article is concerned, and by
reference to which these events can bemore clearly interpreted.What are some of these events?
Prolonged neoliberalization has been feebly opposed and has been devastating to provincial Britain (Agnew, 2005,
p. 444; Jessop, 1994). The reinvigoration of the project in endless Austerity has passed the point of a short-term rem-
edy in the aftermath of 2008 and has now, 10 years later, quite clearly become a new idiomof political economy for the
years ahead, with profound political and geographical characteristics. Another development is the growth in support
for theUnitedKingdom IndependenceParty (UKIP) at the ballot boxes, cutting across fetishized political cartographies
and cherished class categories that were familiar to the industrial state-territory. Instead, it draws upon disaffection
with the newpolitical geography of the British polity, provoking the sense that this development is bound into the relo-
cation of political and cultural power in the state-territory. In similar way, the Scottish Independence referendum and
the turn to the Scottish National Party ought not be mistaken for yet another European breed of ethno-nationalism.
Rather, it seems that its support lies in the reconfigurations of the British state-territory tht have taken place since
the 1980s finally bearing fruit in the catalyst of Austerity politics. Once again, disaffection with the new political eco-
nomic idiom of the British state-territory seems to indicate the growth in Scotland of a pseudo-national, class-based
self-determination vis-à-vis the metropolitan power. Finally, there is Brexit. Popular self-determination arguments for
the Brexit referendum outcome are highly problematic, which seems to resemble an affective reorientation of anti-
establishment ressentiment onto a vague and contrived extra-national other, more than it articulates popular disaffec-
tion with EU government in particular.
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I want to try to bring these developments in contemporary British politics into some kind of relation to one another,
as these events of varying temporality are currently treated in isolation. This analyses therefore remains decidedly
evental. The problem underlying these events is that there has been a reconfiguration in the topology and topography
of the power that dominates the state-territory, which requires a new political geographical understanding. This
political geography requires articulation and the exploration of fresh avenues of political theorizing, if we want to
develop a critical 21st century urban theory through the exploration of particular contexts. By laying outwhatwemight
call the new political aesthetic of the British state, not only will we make the interrelation of these evental political
features more apparent, rendering each event more intelligible, but we may discern a rather different strategic set of
responses to them that are not only plausible but manifestly necessary for those who wish to confront the power of
capital in the British state. This argument therefore has significant implications for reconceptualizing class formation
in post-industrial political geographies dominated by global cities.
The desired effect is to start us thinking on how seemingly national social relations can rather be understood as
class social relations, and thus how the resurgence of apparently ethno-nationalist politics entails, contains and canal-
izes a new form of anti-establishment class politics with possibilities and potentials for radical and critical orientations
propitious for genuinely progressive political action.
I use the concept of a British city-state as an opening gambit for rethinking political spatiality in the current British
social experience. If we are to derive a radical politics of thought-action, resistance to or strategic counter-conduct
against the oligarchic metropolitan power that I claim has arisen through the constitution of this new spatiality, we
must do this in away that is simultaneously (i) novel enough to enable innovative theorizing of those “newgeographical
metaphors and concepts” so necessary for grasping “emergent, post-Westphalian political geographies” (Anderson,
1996, p. 151; Brenner, 1999, p. 67); and yet (ii) that is resonating and familiar enough to recognize intuitively and grasp
practically, so as to be credibly “turned against the heavy arms of the State” as a weapon (Deleuze & Guattari, 2013,
p. 239).
This analysis proceeds in accord with the objectives of the “critical urban theory” that is currently emerging in
sociological discourses of urbanization and that seeks to combat the “epistemology of ‘naïve objectivism’” so prevalent
in thinking on political geographical questions. In trying to think beyond “inherited, naturalized jurisdictional and
sociological visions” (Arboleda, 2017, p. 11), critical urban theory pushes for an epistemological reorientation away
from categorical unities and towards social relations in analysis, a move that is congenial to the “constant reinvention
of the framing categories, methods and assumptions of critical urban theory in relation to the rapidly, unevenly
mutating geographies of capitalist urbanization, especially in the contemporary era of hyperfinancialized, planetary-
scale spatial, institutional and ecological transformation” (Brenner, 2017a, p. 22). Particularly relevant here to the
city–hinterland representation is the struggle in critical urban theory to depart from ahistorical dualisms and binaries
like interior/exterior, city/countryside, urban/rural, society/nature, material/symbolic and of course city/hinterland
(Brenner, 2017b, p. 218, 2017c, p. 265; Brenner & Schmid, 2015). Instead, a more critically potent dialectical mode is
sought, which replaces the scientistic penchant for metaphysical commitments with those radical conceptualizations
necessary for strategic orientations in political and intellectual struggle (Brenner, 2017c, p. 264).
In this light, it is evident that terms such as city, urban, urbanization, nation, state, and so on, are highly problematic
and cannot be “conceived as self-evident empirical entities that can be transparently understood and instrumentally
manipulated by a neutral observer occupying a vantage point external to the sites and processes being investigated”
(Brenner, 2017a, p. 20). While there is no space here to navigate all these terms satisfactorily, I have had to use these
terms provisionally to anchor the analysis in sufficiently familiar terms to be understood. In what follows, terms such
as city, urban, and urbanization should be treated as part of a “sociology of relations”, rather than a “sociology of cate-
gories” (Welsh, 2018), and should be so interpreted to the extent that they facilitate this direction of meaning. This is
essential for understanding the processes, ambiguities, asymmetries, and uneven developments that are central to this
critical project.
Through a somewhat abstract political economy, I am trying to innovate a historical and geographical consciousness
of social practice that relates the particularities of theBritish state to its broader social and economic spatial structures
and to the geopolitical order in a way that gets us past the “reification of state territorial spaces as fixed [ahistorical]
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units of secure sovereign space” that conceptually rule out “spatial variation other than between homogeneous blocks
of territorial space” (Agnew, 1994, p. 77; 1996, p. 1929). This is the critical agenda here, and it is the principal inter-
vention I intend to make in academic discourses on political spatio-temporality. At the heart of this lies an account of
how shifting the register from a spatial to a territorial analytical idiom, bracketing scale, space, and network for the
moment (see Jessop, Brenner, & Jones, 2008), accompanied by an elaboration of what this actually means in terms of
existing discourses of historical sociology and political geography, which will open the door to a more pertinent vector
of critique of the political status quo.
To clarify, the background political argument here is that the strategic and implicitly territorial redefinitions of posi-
tionality and relationality in the British state are intimately bound into: (i) the rise of metropolitan oligarchy in Britain;
(ii) its capture of the state apparatus, broadly defined; (iii) the consequent and instrumental reconfiguration of the
British state-territory into a contado4 of the metropole; (iv) the legitimation of metropolitan dominance by a liberal
ideology of the city; and (v) the ideological canalization of resistance to this new oligarchy into a regressive politics
of jingoism, populist nationalism, and a perverse discourse of English self-determination. To begin this agenda, I shall
introduce three conceptualizations—one principal and two subsidiary—pertaining to the territorialization of social
relations and to the political implications stemming from their respective aesthetics regarding capital accumulation,
topologies of domination, and class formation. Respectively, these are the axiomatic city-state, the poliorcetic vertex,5
and the aesthetic contado. However, before building these concepts into a coherent form, it is necessary to be clear on
the strategic problematic in which this axiomatic city-state has emerged.
2 GLOBAL CITIES: BETWEEN WORLD-SYSTEM AND STATE-TERRITORY
The problem that confronts us, both in general and in particular, is that of grasping the spatio-temporal emergence of
particular state formations that connect state-territories to the capitalist world system at large and that situate the
particularity of a state-territory within the social forces of the world system and its world history.
In terms of the spatio-structural transformation of the state-territory, Britain's post-colonial and post-industrial
legacy has entailed a concentration of the processes and structures of capital accumulation in the metropole as alter-
native poles across the generality of the state-territory have become weakened and subordinated, and are now one
with Nineveh and Tyre. As in other 21st century core states of the capitalist world economy, the especially acute man-
ifestation in the British case of new lines of cleavage within the state-territory has necessitated a radical concentra-
tion of apparatuses able “to monitor, contain, seize, and redistribute resources within national territories” (Tilly, 1994,
p. 27), simultaneous to the apparent melting away of the national referent (Smith, 1998, p. 50–51):
Wecan think of these developments as constituting newgeographies of centrality andmarginality that cut across
the old divide of poor/rich countries, and new geographies of marginality that have become increasingly evident
not only in the less developed world but inside highly developed countries (Sassen, 2000, p. 85).
Behind these various divergences and convergences in our time lurk two colossal processes: globalization and the
crisis of the democratic nation-state (Tonkiss, 2006, pp. 3–4, 56–61). Between these processes, where the most com-
plex meanings of the global are being constituted (Sassen, 2006, p. 1), new forms of stratification, exclusion-inclusion,
spatial reconfiguration, ideological legitimacy, lifestyle vergence and power relations, are emerging from the tensions
and fissures.With the enduring role, therefore, of the territorial-state as the primary formal political structure through
which these two great vectors are coming into dialectical relation with one another, this epochal transformation is
resolutely “taking place inside the national [framework] to a far larger extent than is usually recognized” (Sassen,
2006, p. 1). The British nation-state is literally being pulled apart along the axes of these two world historic poles, but
on a plateau of omnidirectional surfaces, with a resultant deterritorializing “disjuncture in governance” (Mittelman,
1996, p. 197), mademanifest from the 1970s on and resulting in the neo-”liberal problem-space” in which we now live
(Gordon, 1991, p. 16; Burchell, 1993).6 David Harvey has summarized this problematic in more precise geographical
and regional terms:
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Regionality crystallizes according to its own logic out of themolecular processes of capital accumulation in space
and time. In due course the regions thus formed come to play a crucial role in how the body politic of the state as
a whole, defined solely according to some territorial logic, positions itself (Harvey, 2003, p. 105).
I argue that the global city of London, as a particularly potent urban assemblage in the world system, has emerged
as strategic geo-social formation in response to the logic of accumulation and the logic of territory that inscribes a
particular political idiom of command and control over and through that logic of accumulation. This is a matter of
grasping particular theaters of planetary urbanization as one of the “operations of the global” (Stäheli, 2012, p. 233),
which, of course, is not an attempt to represent the global as either a rhetorical strategy or a teleological scale (Stäheli,
2003), but rather it is an attempt to “think the operative dimension of relations” in the world system by situating
them simultaneously in the “materialities and modalities” of that world system (Tellman, Opitz, & Stäheli, 2012,
pp. 210–213). This is a world systemwhere “the hinterlands of major cities, metropolitan regions and urban-industrial
corridors are being reconfigured as they are operationalized” in the metabolism of that world system (Brenner &
Schmid, 2017, p. 188). So how canwe characterize this operationalization, and how canwe comprehend the imperative
that drives this operationalization?
Elsewhere (Welsh, 2017), I have argued that global cities have emerged, in the long-term conjoncture alluded to
above, as strategic post-disciplinary devices in the accumulation dynamic of the world system. By placing global cities
into the chronic contradictions of accumulation in world ecology, we can begin to see how rapid planetary urbaniza-
tion is connected with the disparate phenomena of globalization in a way that begins to clarify how global cities such
as London are implicated in the emplacement of global oligarchy as a strategic reaction to persistent and drawn out
accumulation crisis across the core states of the world system. The “frontier inversion” of the world system that is
characteristic of this conjoncture (Moore, 2015), and that is internalizing capitalist appropriation strategies and struc-
tures to the core states, can be understood as the global imperative according to which the axiomatic city-state is but
one particular spatio-temporal response. The particularity of that response is amatter of historical legacy, political cul-
ture, geographical situation, and contingent strategic action in class formation. What follows is an exploration of this
strategic response to world systemic crisis.
Three deficiencies in the theorizing on global cities and urban assemblages need to be addressed in terms of the
spatio-temporal particularity of strategic response in theBritish case, and thesedeficienciesmust be remedied through
novel conceptualizations and innovative additions. The first is the insufficient grounding of emergent topographies of
accumulation in the social metabolism of theworld system in away that brings out the new relation of thematerial and
symbolic in the reproduction of capital. A number of scholars have pointed out that we need to integrate assemblage
thinking with other critical traditions in global political economy, if we want not only to enrich its abstractions but to
reinsert important structures into the increasingly ethereal conceptualizations of the urban assemblage, particularly in
respect to the ontology of advanced or contemporary capitalism (Brenner,Madden, &Wachsmuth, 2011; Farías, 2011;
Wachsmuth, Madden, & Brenner, 2011).
A second necessity is to resituate the territorial logic of power (Arrighi, 2010; Sassen, 2000) into a new relation
with the logic of accumulation. This means discerning the contingent political action entailed in the emergence of
global cities as a strategic response to the contradictions and crises of accumulation in the world system. While
the necessity of accumulation conditions the parameters of action, a variety of strategic responses in the dialectic
of contradiction offers space for contingent agency. The topography of the state-territory is constituted through
strategic action, and even tactical action; it is not a given to be merely accepted. This makes a critical political
geography of the state-territory an essential consideration for reformation in the dominant regime of political
economy.
A third priority is to explore new relationships between urban assemblages and their various hinterlands. While
global cities have been analyzed in terms of their internal dynamics (Sassen, 1991), as well as their relation to each
other (Friedmann &Wolff, 1982), much less consideration has been given to the effect of the emergence of the global
city on the state-territories in which they are situated. This is hardly surprising, given the usual geographical and social
location of global cities’ research (that is, metropolitan elites who have little interest in exposing their dominion), but it
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is an exigency if we wish to think critically on the emergence of a metropolitan oligarchy and its crystallizing political
geographies of social subordination, domination, and dispossession.
In light of these deficiencies, what can we say about the global city as the ligature and linchpin between the
particularity of a state-territory and the generality of the world system? The spatio-temporality of the capitalist
totality is in perpetual motion, shifting and displacing the flows of value around that totality through the sublative
impetuous of dialectical relations that are realized locally. Rosa Luxemburg's (2003) limit point of internalization need
never be reached, even in an utterly global capitalism, as retreat from an exhaustive capitalist contact in any given
locale is entirely consistent with the ongoing momentum of the accumulation process as a totality. This is so even if
it entails colossal destruction (Harvey, 2010a), anti-production (Guattari, 1984), frontier inversion (Moore, 2015),
and accumulation reboot in any given theater of capital's empire (Meiksins-Wood, 2016, p. 131). In this manner, as
an expanding and potentially contracting “ecological totality” (Harvey, 2010b, p. 196), capital can probably continue
to function indefinitely (Harvey, 2015, p. 220). The emergence of our city-state in the neoliberal reconfiguration of
the global capitalist order since the late-1970s constitutes an enabling socio-geographic structure, a servo of global
capital, a spatio-temporal fix on the grandest scale accelerating through the tipping point, and has been derived to
facilitate a strategic global displacement through the mechanisms of switching crises (Harvey, 2006, p. 428–429;
2010a, p. 93), and by a devastating retreat of capital at local and provincial levels at the threshold of transcendence
(for provincial deindustrialization, see Sassen, 1991, pp. 8–9). This means that we ought to ruminate on the capacity
of historical capitalism, as a set of relations and axioms of asymmetric flow and uneven development, to reinvent itself,
shifting fromplace to place, reconfiguring space as it is canalized by it (Lefèbvre, 1976, 1991), and thereby strategically
defeating themoments of transcendence in capitalist social relations that are immanent to its logic. Asymmetric social
relations in the global flow of capital are immanent to the ontology of historical capitalism, as without them there
would be nomotion, no accumulation, and thus no capital (value inmotion).
This spatio-temporal dynamic, and its polar forces across multiple surfaces, is capitalist empire (Hardt & Negri,
2000, 2005). It is the topological tracing of the command and control of the capitalist class onto the global regime
of accumulation, and it is from the dialectical contradictions between the reproduction of the regime of accumula-
tion and the material social metabolism that the axiomatic city-state formation is actualized in the world system as
a geographically and historically particular state apparatus. These are the conditions in which the metropolitan posi-
tionalities of surplus value appropriation—poliorcetic assemblage—are established, and in which the new aesthetic of
class subordination—aesthetic contado—is inscribed, as two complementary strategic components of the axiomatic
city-state.
The morphing of 21st century UK into a city-state represents, therefore one of the processes of denationalization;
processes that are nevertheless “part of globalization even though they are localized in national, indeed subnational,
settings” (Sassen, 2006, p. 2). We are dealing with intranational processes that are simultaneously “oriented towards
global agendas and systems,” while being “instantiations of the global, which are structured inside the national” (2006,
pp. 2, 3). I believe the axiomatic city-state concept is an effective means of unpacking these processes and for getting
to grips with “new types of global scalings of dynamics and institutions” in a way that does not “freeze the image of
state territoriality into a generalized ontological feature of social life” (Brenner, 1999, p. 50; Sassen, 2006, p. 1), even
if it does unavoidably offer a momentarily fixed tableau. What it does supply is a means for rethinking the city-state
formation in historical capitalism.
The original historical discourse on the city-state is where any critical political analysis of this kind must simultane-
ously begin anddepart. This is so ifwewish to animate the critical politics of territoriality (Agnew, 2013; Brenner, 1998,
1999; Ruggie, 1993). Deployed as a historical ideal-type, there is a danger of the city-state concept pulling us back into
the hated Cartesian state-centrism that rarefies space container-like or restricts us intellectually to the retrospection
of purely historical regimesof capital accumulation (Agnew, 1994;Brenner, 1999, pp. 40, 46). It seems therefore imper-
ative not so much to remove the state from analysis, which would be “a denial of the state's continued relevance as a
major geographical locus of social power” (Brenner, 1999, p. 41), but to decenter and recharacterize it in terms of “an
articulated concept of territory” (Elden, 2013, p. 9). My articulation of the axiomatic city-state is that of a particular
historical and geographical configuration of the state apparatus of surplus value capture.7 It is one that allows us to
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escape the territorial trap of state-centrism that ensnares us between space as an ahistorical static platform of social
action and “state territoriality as a preconstituted, naturalized, or unchanging scale of analysis” (Brenner, 1999, pp. 41,
45). It rather offers a way to approach the territorialization of positionalities of capture upon which urban oligarchy
develops and prospers in the 21st century conditions of capitalist empire.
I believe this maneuver is both justifiable and worthwhile because, as the epigram suggests, in the contemporary
British experience the axiomatic city-state concept has clear intellectual valence as a heuristic device (Glassner,
2004, pp. 3, 6), or as rhetorical political weapon for rearticulating new terms of class struggle within the state. The
concept has clear force as a “rhetorical pronouncement” (Agnew, 1997, p. 102). Additionally, it provides one of
those summarizing concepts that Immanuel Wallerstein thought necessary not only for apprehending phenomena,
but for creating knowledge upon which we can predicate our politics (1974, p. 415). The axiomatic city-state con-
cept offers one of those mental conceptions by which we may realize the labor of programmatic action (Harvey,
2010b, p. 195; Marx, 1990, pp. 283–284). Thus, such an arguably reductivist procedure can be justified as part
of an intellectually political move to generate “fundamentally interested knowledge” (Foucault, 2013, p. 227), so
that we might meet the needs of a radically alternative way of governing our British population and ourselves in
the world system of the near future. What is required is a concept that has the analytic, rhetorical, and didactic
potency to draw together various strands of critical thinking into a politically relevant and striking argument for a
new paradigm of thought-action in British politics that is constitutive of class struggle, rather than ethno-nationalist
regression. It becomes a way to reconceive populism not in simple national terms, but in class terms, as with the
city-states of ancient and early modern Europe, though articulated into the axiomatics of an advanced capitalist world
system.
I offer the city-state concept, therefore, as a tool of my political analysis, not the beginning of a scientific statement.
It is not an epistemic representation providing a scientific model, but a critical epistemic condition, a regulative idea
that claims no ontological or explanatory exclusivity and simply aims to fashion a particular political discourse and
critique. It is not a positive or utopian “image of the city” (Lynch, 1960), but a negative image intended to establish
a critical object. Minimally, it is an attempt at a “discursive framing of spatiotemporal options,” and a nudging of the
“necessary horizons of themodern political imagination” towards a greater contingency of spatial limits (Agnew, 1997,
p. 102;Walker, 1992, p. 6). Maximally, it is one of the “models of realization” of a worldwide axiomatic capitalism in the
here and now that is immanent and excessive of form (Deleuze &Guattari, 2013, p. 528).
The point of resuscitating the historical city-state resituated into the accumulation regime of capitalist empire
today is therefore not to make a systematic comparative analysis, nor to offer an anachronistically “simple transpo-
sition of historical moulds” in the form of a timeless model, but rather to “let the knowledge of the past work on the
experience of the present” (Foucault, 2010, pp. 130–131). Although new metaphors are needed for world politics,
this is not a “simple reversal of a long-lost past” (Anderson, 1996, p. 150). However, historical familiarity with the
tropes and structures of oligarchic city-state formations now imbricated into the dynamic of advanced capitalist
social relations and axioms can help to stimulate some historically versatile yet fresh reimaginings of the relation
of territoriality to the state (Anderson, 1996). But this is only if we are duly sensitive to geographical and historical
particularity and emphatically do not deploy it as an ideal type (Friedmann &Wolff, 1982, p. 313).
With this inmind, I neverthelesswant politically to emphasize the historic city-state's practical and ideological com-
mitment to themaintenance of privilege, recalling the aristocratic origins of the commune as a recurrent configuration
of associated human habitation (Martines, 1980, p. 184). But establishing the city-state as a potent historical template
for the political and social territorialization of privilege ismerely a beginning. LauroMartines argued rightly of the city-
state that the problem is “to trace the workings of privilege, to unveil its covert forms and to see its ramifications,” all
the more so if we wish to attain a more contemporary understanding on the complex plateaux of advanced capitalism,
but a conceptualization is a useful beginning. The historical city-state fromwhich my thinking draws its critical energy
is not then the Aristotelian city-state conceived as the horizon of the political and a recapitulated polis of the zōon poli-
tikón, nor is it strictly the early-modern city-state that famously obstructed the formation of territorial-fiscal states like
Hobbes's “worm in the entrails”. Rather it is a matter of the axiomatized and axialized city-state of advanced capital-
ism “for whom stasis is death” (Virilio, 2006, p. 40), and yet for which the necessary vertices of friction and deflection
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must be established to capture the flows of value in a supposedly smooth space of effortless capitalism sans frontières
(Ohmae, 1990; Reich, 1992).
As the key conceptualization of this exploration, the axiomatic city-state is an attempt to coordinate the historical
familiarity of the city-state concept—mobilizing all its historical semantic resonances of urban oligarchy, capital appro-
priation, social stratification, and class antagonism—with the contemporary context of an advanced capitalist world
system that requires assemblages of fixity and flow. It is through the concept of the axiomatic city-state that I want to
address a vital question emerging in regard to global cities: how to relate theworld system through city assemblages to
their various hinterlands. My response is built on the twin imperatives to accumulate (Marx) and to govern (Foucault);
the logic of capital and the logic of territory.
2.1 Concept 1: The axiomatic city-state
So how has this axiomatic city-state formation arisen, what is the topology from which it draws its form, whence the
social forces of transformation, andwhat is the dynamicmotor throughwhich its positionalities have been structured?
By my vectored and axial notion of the city-state as a convergent point of conjunction for flows, where the city
becomes a stopover point on “the synoptic path of a trajectory” in the flow of capital (Virilio, 2006, p. 31), I treat the
city in situ more as an assemblage than as either an aggregation of systems of fragmented sovereignty (Tilly, 1990,
pp. 21, 25), or territories “reified as set or fixed units of sovereign space” (Agnew, 1994, p. 59). This means under-
standing that “territory is a political technology” (Elden, 2013, p. 14), in which positionalities are established, not in
spatially extensive terms of location, but in terms of relationality. It means thinking about the British polity not as a
spatially extensive surface of absolute space contained by a littoral boundary and governed through the intervention
into that space by a sovereign authority, but rather as an aggregation of social relations between people inscribed into
and realized through thematerialmediumof their relative position in “relational space” (Lefèbvre, 1991). Thematrix of
these social relations mediated through topographical position is territory and as the density of these social relations
intensifies with proximity to the metropole an assemblage begins to form. This is the axiomatic city-state of advanced
capitalism.
As can be seen, this rethinking of territory and territorialization is an attempt to depart from the ontology of planer
extension, beholden as it is to entrenched mapping bogged down in the dimensional geometric terminology of levels,
spheres, layers, and radii, and a scalar continuum from the individual through the national to the global, along which
we seem tomove back and forth arbitrarily or paradigmatically at our scholarly leisure. The spatial, axial, and relational
complexities of the global city are immense, so wemust get away from suchmental conceptions of the city as a “radius
of an imaginary circle” (Tilly, 1986, p. 306), according to which either the capital is bounded by the courtines8 of the
M25 or it is extended into a post-industrial south-east “city-region” (Brenner, 1998, p. 23). The notion of a qualitatively
specific and discrete city, and therefore by implication its putative hinterland, is profoundly questionable in a milieu of
rapid planetary urbanization where even spaces that lie well beyond traditional city cores and suburban peripheries
have become integral parts of a worldwide urban fabric. This means that “the urban can no longer be understood with
reference to a particular ‘type’ of settlement space, whether defined as a city, a city-region, a metropolis, a metropoli-
tan region, a megalopolis, an edge city, or otherwise” (Brenner & Schmid, 2017, pp. 186–189), but must entail a new
conception of the reach of social relations.
This is especially important to bear in mind if we take urbanization as a process (Harvey, 1996), and if we perceive
the capitalist world system as one constituted by spaces of flows as well as by spaces of place (Ruggie, 1993, p. 172).
The dromology of the axiomatic city-state,9 the progressive annihilation of space through time in historical capital-
ism (Harvey, 2010b, p. 206), destroys any scalar delimitation of the city (or indeed the state) and necessitates a more
imaginative dimensionality. The negation of space as the reduction of distances has become a strategic reality (Virilio,
2006, p. 149). Thus, Charles Tilly's cartographic “monochromas that represent more or less continuous sovereignty
over extensive territories” (Tilly, 1986, p. 301) threaten to bind us to the homogeneous planer extensio of the territo-
rial state with an immanent center and divisible homologous parts (Deleuze & Guattari, 2013, p. 453), and imprison
us intellectually in “homogeneous blocks of territorial space” (Agnew, 1996, p. 1929). The apparent obviousness of a
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circumferential littoral to the state-territory in the British case simply reinforces this fetish. The potential implication
of a territorial way of thinking is that we can entertain a view of citizenship understood in terms of an aesthetic rela-
tion to something in a space of flows, rather than as a location on a spatially delimited surface. Tomap such a territorial
citizenship should become amajor preoccupation in our new political geography.
Regarding the formation of global cities, it is not somuch that “the processes that accumulate and concentrate cap-
ital also produce cities” (Tilly, 1990, p. 17), but that the city is that process of accumulation as an assemblage, a “constel-
lation of singularities and traits deducted from the flow—selected, organized, stratified—in such a way as to converge”
at and through the assemblage (Deleuze & Guattari, 2013, p. 473). The assemblage is also therefore as architectural,
or geological, as it is fluvial. It is necessarily of a minimally fixed degree of physicality to satisfy the needs of capital to
reproduce through time, and it is the intensified points of deflections that afford the “geographical embeddedness of
capital” that makes it “place sticky” (Sassen, 2001; Yeung, 1998, pp. 293, 299), even in the supposedly borderless and
frictionless idiom of finance (Ohmae, 1990). It is true that we need to get past that “bias of our conceptual equipment
in favor of the space-of-places,” and which prejudices us “against the space-of flows of capital that defines the process
of capital accumulation” in the hyperspace of capital (Arrighi, 2010, pp. 81, 85; Ruggie, 1993, p. 172). However, capital
accumulation historically has developed simultaneously in both spaces. The axiomatic city-state concept contributes
to a reassessment of the territorial relation between both in the contemporary British particularity by integrating into
a political geography those semioticmodulations that animate the emplacedmateriality of theBritish state in the idiom
of financialization.
The more particular problem that we then have is to redefine how territoriality has changed regarding the global
city, and regarding thematrices of social relations fromwhich it is constituted. The neoliberal view of the city since the
1980s has been that of the multicultural melting pot that doubles as a great productivist engine of prosperity. It is the
utopianism of Mandeville's Fable of the Bees (1724/1989), alloyed to Jane Jacobs's encomia to the city (1970, 1985), in
which the life of the mercantile city is rejuvenated and energetic prosperity is unleashed by breaking down enframing
and overbearing structures of constraint both in relations between people and in their conceptualizations. The upshot
of this celebratory discourse is that vicious chaos is virtuous prosperity, and that to apply democratic controls through
thoughtful scrutiny and concerted action in the name of whatever category (nation, class, or the people) is to retard,
contain, and overcode to our collective impoverishment. The message is simple: if we interfere with the metropoli-
tan oligarchy they will bankrupt us or take their dazzling qualities elsewhere. Geopolitically, the city must therefore
become free, autonomous, and unconstrained from any territory in which it might be situated and independent of any
sovereign power exercised from it, if it is to prosper. However, the city is its relations, and those relations are entirely
positive in the Nietzschean sense. In the necessary asymmetry of capitalist social relations, unconstraint at one end
means subordination at the other. Over the last three decades duringwhich this has been taking place through the dis-
juncture in governance outlined above, an international metropolitan elite has emerged from within the metropolitan
center with interests, experiences, and horizons antithetical to the national referent and culturally and ideologically
autonomous from the state-territory as a whole.
The problem, therefore, with the Mandevillean tableau, and thus with the self-satisfied liberal ideology of the city
that it inspires, is that it offers consideration only of the moment of deterritorialization and nothing of the reterrito-
rialization that necessarily coexists with it (Deleuze & Guattari, 2013). The result is to overemphasize the decodified
energy released by the “grumbling hive” from those codified structures of constraint and sclerosis that Mandeville
claimed of the early modern mercantilist, seigniorial, feudal, or ecclesiastical city, and that liberals now claim of the
national social referent and its economically illiterate and politically incorrect constituents. The consequence today
is to ignore the axiomatic moment of recodification actualized since the 1980s, and it is by consideration of this very
thing via the axiomatic city-state conceptual brace that the appropriative apparatus of themetropolitan oligarchy and
its retainers can be identified regardless of the celebratory neoliberal bromides asserted about themetropole.
The neoliberal police science of the British state has been tasked with enforcing the territorialization of the neolib-
eral city since the 1980s. This has meant striating the global city's interior space to establish a new territorial constel-
lation of positionalities over the flow of capital. This reterritorializing capture of flows in value has been at the heart
of the successive topological complications and displacements in the government of a “liberal problem-space” over the
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last four decades of British political history (Gordon, p. 1991, p. 16). All is subordinate to the survival and strengthening
of the state apparatus, regardless of content or character, for it is its political reason (Foucault, 2002).
The historical and geographical particularity in the state apparatus's content and character may be motivated and
influenced by the changing global regime of accumulation in capitalist empire, but politically contingent struggle is
decisive. Through this, a new territoriality is established for the state apparatus. It is bymapping this new territoriality
that we can grasp the new political aesthetics of the British city-state, and thus come to understand how we have
become ruled not by the home-grown heroes of capitalist production, as we have been told, but by the transnational
warriors of capture and appropriation, in whose interest any further deterritorialization of the neoliberal city-state
must be held in abeyance at all costs.
My presentation of the aesthetic components that are constitutive of the axiomatic city-state is broken down into
the poliorcetic vertex and the aesthetic contado. Simply, these sub-concepts of the axiomatic city-state refer to the for-
mationsof domination and subordination, respectively, in the reterritorializationof class power that is realized through
the reconfigurations of the axiomatic city-state. These seemingly esoteric terms are actually fairly simple, but are nec-
essarily named in this way in order simultaneously to situate them in a historical discourse of city-state formation, to
draw semantic connections from certain post-structuralist lines of theorizing (Virilio, Rancière, Deleuze-Guattari), and
to render them apposite for the hyper-semiotic idiom of advanced capitalism.
2.2 Concept 2: The poliorcetic vertex
Behind the analysis and argument below lies a key claim regarding the changing logic of political economy in the capi-
talist world system. The expanding frontier of commodification in the world system, as discussed variously by Federici
(2004), Luxemburg (2003), Marx (1993), and Mies (1986), is becoming mired in crises of continued capital accumula-
tion brought about by strategic contradictions in the totality of capitalist social relations (Moore, 2015). The result is a
zero-sum political economy in the capitalist core states (Hornborg, 2001, 2009), whereby accumulationmust continue
but it must be accumulation through techniques of absolute surplus value extraction, rather than the more socially
acceptable extraction of relative surplus value. The exploitation of labor through productive processes in an expanding
reproduction of the totality of capitalist relations is therefore making way for an increase in redistributive disposses-
sion (Bin, 2018, p. 80) realized in apparatuses of capital appropriation.
If the totality of capitalist social relations can no longer expand at its historical frontiers, then new local frontiers
must be created internal to the core of that world system. This means that an inversion of the frontier of capitalization
is becomingmanifest in theworld systemas frontiers of capitalization are being inscribed in the core states themselves
(Moore, 2015). As dominant elites struggle to construct positionalities of surplus extraction, as the predicate for the
actual accumulation of capital through commodity exchange, new territorialities of capital accumulation emergeon the
political topography of the world system along with new constellations of social relations of political domination. The
axiomatic city-state is one such territorialized constellation.
Therefore, as in other historical and geographical instances of strategic appropriation, urban oligarchies in such
circumstances evince a marked tendency toward a predication of their political and economic power on position over
capital flows, rather than on leadership and the orchestration of production (Arrighi, 2010; Harvey, 2013; Martines,
1980; Meiksins-Wood, 2003). It is the consideration of this that is lacking in contemporary representations of British
political economy, dominated as they are by neoclassical political economy and its hegemonic liberal ideology of the
city. There is also a lack of recognition of this political economy in thinking on urban assemblages, as indicated earlier.
I propose the term poliorcetic vertex as a more effective way to conceptualize the formation and reproduction
of the positionalities of surplus appropriation that sustains metropolitan oligarchy. Derived from Greek, poliorcetics
(𝜋ο𝜆𝜄ο𝜌𝜅𝜂𝜏𝜄𝜅𝛼) is concerned with the techniques, forms, strategies, science, or art of fortification and siege warfare.
A vertex is simply a point at which either a number of vectors converge or a point at which a vector deflects or
deviates from a trajectory. Taken together, the concept of the poliorcetic vertex therefore denotes a semiotic yet
material positionality established at a point or surface of deflection in the flow of capital, a figurative glacis or a
convergence point that must be maintained and defended amidst antagonistic forces (Virilio, 2006). Ironically, though
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it is quite abstract, this innovation is essential in order territorially to ground the urban assemblage into the material
social metabolism, so as to enable the exposure of the positionalities of capture that sustain an urban oligarchy
through time over the vectored capital that flows through the urban assemblage. Social poliorcetics concerns the
establishment of social relations that are fixed to a sufficient degree by proprietorial control over the relational
positionality, which are then defended, and which can be achieved by physical, semiotic or symbolic, legal, discursive,
or other cultural and ideological means. It is in the establishment of this patrimonial control that the subtle political
agency of metropolitan elites is made manifest for what it is: more the martial seizure of social position by a neo-
feudal aristocracy than the productive activity of a hyper-bourgeois “creative class” (Florida, 2005; Graham, 2010,
p. 47).
The productivist apologetics in the liberal city mistakes effect for cause, form for substance, signifier for signified,
and revenue for wealth. This view fails properly to perceive the state apparatus of the axiomatic city-state, not
as the producer but as the converter and capturer of the value in motion that is vectored through it (Deleuze &
Guattari, 2013, p. 451). Capitalists large and small do indeed “occupy the realm of exploitation, where the relations
of production and exchange themselves yield surpluses, and capitalists capture them” (Tilly, 1990, p. 17). However,
whilst the heroic capitalist exploits at the moment of production, the capturer appropriates from the flow of value
by deflection in the medium of social relations, that is, by their positionality on/in the territory of the axiomatic
city-state. The exploiter and appropriator are two distinct roles or bearers of relations (Träger), though sometimes
unified practically in a single person. What we take to be productive activity in the reproductive activities of a
metropolitan elite is then rather the topographic realization of value produced elsewhere, or elsewhen, and by
others.
The point here is that the value flowing through this aggregation of positionalities of capture is overwhelmingly
produced elsewhere in the capitalist world system through laboring activity in nature, even if the matrices of the flow
of value are commanded from the strategic vertices of the core states of capitalist empire. It is this feature of the
axiomatic city-state reconfiguration that reduces the rest of the state-territory to the same status as themost far flung
regions of the formal empire of yore.
This constitutive activity is a frenetic and competitive construction of positionalities of capture (appropriation)
in aggregation that make up the establishment of the poliorcetic vertex as a grand strategic assemblage of capi-
tal accumulation in the state apparatus set into the spatio-temporal imperative motions of historical capitalism.
The non-productive activity of capture consists in acquiring patrimonial control over the momentary points of
convergence in the global flows of capital (value in motion) that converge on the metropolitan assemblage. This
means that territory is not really a juridico-political notion, as has been claimed (Elden, 2013, p. 7; Foucault, 1980,
p. 68), for, as with nine-tenths of the law, patrimonial control is more a matter of de facto possession than de jure
property. Just consider the scramble for educational credentials in institutions increasingly concentrated around
the metropole, think about the access to media projection located exclusively in the London circle, reflect upon
the subtle and radiating insinuation of metropolitan speech patterns across the state-territory in place of received
pronunciation that mark a person as a metropolitan insider, and of course, note the plutocratic reproduction secured
by soaring house prices that act to purge politically aspirational citizens from proximity to all these advantageous
positionalities.
In the 21st century tripartite division of labor, introduced by Robert Reich (1992, pp. 174–180), symbolic analysts
are set apart from the routine production servers (wage slaves) and in-person servers (domestics) over whom they
rule. As semiotic manipulators and engineers of the poliorcetic vertex, they are not the heroes of production but
the “warriors of capture” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2013). They are not merely bankers, financiers, lawyers, property
“developers,” media moguls, or politicians, but anyone capable of establishing control over monopoly rent-seeking
positions. In this way the austerity regime opens itself up to a variety of immanent critiques: not only is the austerity
of the provincial populations at odds with the waste and conspicuous consumption of an over-capitalized metropole,
but this capital is not deployed in domestic rounds of production, but is either consumed away (destroyed) or spir-
ited away (capital flight). So much for the powerhouse of the UK economy. Where does this leave the rest of the
citizenry?
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2.3 Concept 3: aesthetic contado
The aesthetic contado offers us a way of understanding not only how class is generated from relations of domi-
nation, dispossession, exploitation, and appropriation, but how reconfigurations and reterritorialization of these
relations generate new isomorphic lines of class. In brief political terms, the former state-territory of the UK (and
beyond) has become a “vast camp” and “hinterland in which activity [is] on the decline” (Virilio, 2006, p. 40). If
the political structures of the capitalist state must preserve a sense of spatial integrity, and this cannot be in the
name of national identity, it must be that of some kind of territoriality (Walker, 1992, p. 11). It is in this territo-
riality that a post-industrial and post-disciplinary notion of class can be conjured from the social aesthetics of
subordination.
In the sociological understanding, class is assumed as a categorical entity, a grouped unit, an object of more or less
clearly delimited coherence and discreteness. It is something that can be rendered into statistical form, tabulated, and
studied as a thing. In this view, class is a socioeconomic stratum of society, it is an identity group, it is the basis for orga-
nization, it is something of which one is a member. This makes it a conceptualization that is congenial to the extensive
notions of space. However, in the idiom of political economy, class is something relational. In the historical materialist
tradition of political economy in particular, it is a social relation generated by themodeof production; in our case, a cap-
italist mode of production. More precisely, and despite the tremendous range of intellectual positions on this, class is
the experience of the social relation of exploitation/appropriation contrived through various techniques. In this under-
standing, the key determinant of class is a “common shared element” in how the aesthetic relations of capitalist society
are experienced (Hardt &Negri, 2005, p. 100). Put another way, it is the set of common experience and common inter-
ests in being exploited, appropriated, or dispossessed (Meiksins-Wood, 2016, p. 91), and it is away of approaching class
that conjuncts the changing topology of the state-territory to changes in the material social metabolism through the
conceptual shift to territory. How does this political economic approach to class map onto the new cartography of the
British state?
The boundaries of regions of this sort are always fuzzy and porous, yet the interlocking flows within the terri-
tory produce enough structured coherence to mark the geographical area off as somehow distinctive relative to
all other areas within a national economy or beyond. Structured coherence usually extends well beyond pure
economic exchanges, fundamental though these may be, for it typically encompasses attitudes, cultural values,
beliefs, and even religious and political affiliations among both capitalists and those whom they employ. (Harvey,
2003, p. 102)
The first implication of abandoning spatial extension is that the state-territory ending at the coastline that marks off
the geographical area must be abandoned and a more complex and abstract, though no less material, notion of terri-
tory be again explored. The advanced communications technologies implicated in our contemporary social relations
are also important in rendering these social relations both more complex and more difficult to locate. If we shift our
understanding of the British polity away from a spatial container in which we are all equally citizens of the state, and
insteadmove toward a complex of territorialized social relations in which our individual positionalities in this complex
are fundamentally asymmetric and oriented to the intensities of the metropolitan assemblage of the axiomatic city-
state formation, then a different picture emerges. Nowwe have an understanding of citizenship, not in the Hobbesian
universal and equal subordination of all to the state in a given spatial jurisdiction of sovereign power, but a highly vari-
able, uneven, and asymmetric topography of axial social relations increasingly poliorcetic as they converge upon the
intensities of the metropolitan assemblage.What then emerges from the common aesthetic and daily experience that
individuals have of this formation is a non-exhaustive class phenomenon. What was hitherto a uniform national mem-
bership (nationality), or membership of a category determined by lines of identity and difference (sociological class),
now becomes a stratified and differential experience of being generated as a class through the establishment of social
relations, that is to say, the experience common to a (large) social fraction of being subordinated to ametropole in vary-
ing degrees by a complex set of techniques and apparatuses of exploitation, appropriation, or dispossession. This new,
admittedly variable and uneven, relation of the state-territory to the city-assemblage lays the intellectual foundations
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for our new social class-citizenship of this city-state in territorial terms beyond the bounded and exclusive absolute
space of the UK.
The usual metaphor deployed historically when discussing the immediate geographical plane of extraction from
which the stratum of the city-state is established by the state apparatus for the purposes of capture of global capi-
tal flows, is the “hinterland”. However, this betrays an overlymercurial way of thinking that is too redolent of theHansa
and the benignmerchant of Kant's perpetual peace,10 bywhich that planer extension is understood simply as source of
materials and labor, and a destination market for exotic commodity chains via the metropolitan entrepôt. In the semi-
otic idiom of finance, with its emphasis on command and control, and in the relational topography of the axiomatic
city-state, this planer expression seems inadequate. Instead, the relation of social positionalities connecting the state-
territory as a whole to the metropolitan power, is more pertinently summed up by the term contado, along with all
its more germane historical connotations of coercion, tribute, and muster, in a state-territory subjected to chronic
appropriation.
Conventionally, the contado is that terrain in relation to a city over which the latter's sovereign juridical and coer-
cive power is exercised, typically over a “consolidated national enclosure” in themodern context (Bratton, 2006, p. 11).
But this is insufficient. As the nation-state disintegrates imperfectly, incompletely, and asymmetrically to a territorial-
state, a structural antagonistic synthesis within the state is revealed that formalizes in a contextually particular way
the “capitalized-coercion paths of state transformation” regarding social formations with dominant cities (Tilly, 1994,
p. 12). This is what we have seen in the British political narrative since the neoliberal counterrevolution destroyed
the national industrial base, dismantled the public spaces of the provinces within, and redefined the political “we”
along sectional, class, or other lines (Agnew, 2005, p. 444). Tilly's “well-defined, continuous territory” of the state is
problematized (1994, p. 4), and reconfigured from a spatio-planer extension and referential imaginary into a strate-
gic and membranous ambiguity of city and integrated contado, over which the former maintains more than a vulgar
juridico-structural sovereignty,and is in accord with a relational dimensionality more complex than the “simple legal-
istic map of state sovereignty” (Walker, 1992, p. 46). The contado is a way to grasp the dialectical relation of territory
and assemblage in the sovereignty regime of the axiomatic city-state formation (Agnew, 2005, p. 438), but it is just as
much the sovereign logic of capitalist empire, as it is any juridico-political monopoly over coercive authority, and this
logic is inscribed into the territory in an aesthetic structure appropriate to a capitalist idiom of constantly internalized
contradictions.
What is vital to thepolitical economyof the axiomatic city-state is that its citizens occupy JamesAnderson's position
of “antagonistic synthesis” (1996) that they are within reach of the metropolitan assemblage but are simultaneously
denied access to its privileged positionalities of capture and command over capital (value in motion). Without it there
would be no capitalistic state. On the one hand, the “making of spatial exclusivity is vital to the incorporation of social
practices under state regulation” (Agnew, 1994, p. 71), and the motion toward privatizations and enclosures canalizes
affects and consigns spatially in a closing syntax of control. On the other hand, and at the same time, without inclusion
therewould benoextraction of surplus value, no condensation or rationalization of value back to the socialmetabolism
through command over labor power. The fixities of the poliorcetic vertex require defense, repair, manning by a retinue
of modern squires, substitutes, and prostitutes. The penumbra of inclusion-exclusion is essential to the contado's ter-
ritoriality, constituting a kind of aesthetic threshold to capital's flow, and city-state formations have proven time and
again to be a historically effective and versatile topological device for realizing this antagonistic synthesis in the aes-
thetics of political economy.
This presentationmakesus ask, rather than the spatially extensivequestionof our coordinatesor location in adelim-
ited space or imagined community of extension (i.e., the UK), what might be the territorialization, coding, and affective
quality of the relation one has to the positionalities of exploitation and appropriation that make up the metropolitan
assemblage through which the sovereign logic of capital is rendered into a political strategy constituting those in the
provinces as contadini, regardless of any formal national citizenship or ethnos conventionally understood. It also rede-
fines the problem of class organization by shifting emphasis from fetishized units of categorical identity to isomorphic
lines of aesthetic experience, openingup conditions of possibility for newconfigurations of class organizationpertinent
to the new topographical configurations of power relations in the post-disciplinary state-territory.
72 WELSH
In thisway,wecanalso start to rethink thehistorical subject of struggle in themodeofproduction thathasbeen frac-
tured, dispersed, and disorganized across the core states in the evanescence of Fordism, Keynesianism, welfare state
capitalism, and industrialism, and overtaken by the “end of work” (Amin, 1995; Görz, 2012; Offe, 1985; Sabel & Piore,
1984). While the factory in its broadest sense as an armature of disciplinary power no longer constitutes the principal
technology of dispossession and control in themode of production (Deleuze, 1992), wemust search for expressions of
the “social factory” (Negri, 1992), in order to perceive once again the operational aesthetic of capitalist dispossession,
and so to anticipate the classes that this aesthetic will always generate anew in historical capitalism. If the poliorcetic
vertex asmetropolis is a likely formation throughwhich the social factory is to be orchestrated and coordinated (Negri,
2018), then the aesthetic contado expresses themanner inwhich class is generated in the new idiomand indicates how
the problem of organization can be reformulated and revitalized, and grasped by the horns.
3 CONCLUSION
It is actually very difficult to give a tangible or systematic presentation, let alone empirical details, of this axiomatic city-
state in a way that will satisfy the need for clarity amongst many social scientists. The purpose of this article is not to
offermodels to be applied, but to begin a process of “adventurous, experimental and boundary-exploding” reconceptu-
alization that can then “facilitate empirical investigation and visualization” in subsequent analyses (Brenner & Schmid,
2017, p. 190). Therefore, it is through a critical distancing from the conventional ways of looking at global cities that a
sense of the London-UK assemblage can emerge, rather than through the explicit exposition of empirical relations or
positionalities on my part. My intention here is to get others to think through what they observe via the conceptual-
izations I have attempted to formulate in this piece. By giving toomuch empirical detail and offering toomuch content
either to the concepts or the assemblage itself, this aimcaneasily becomeobscured anddistractedbyobjections poten-
tially aroused by those empirical exempla (for some empirical examples, seeWelsh, 2017).
The purpose of my argument is rather to show how it is by thinking through the axiomatic city-state concept, espe-
cially in territorial rather than extensive spatial terms, what appears as national or ethnic politics can more easily be
seen as a form of class politics. Our city-state is built on the twin pillars of the positionalities of capture and the aes-
thetic creation of subordinate class experiences, and the relations of domination that are generated from them.
What is to be done? A number of political directions are open to us. We can begin by understanding the vari-
ously anti-metropolitan, anti-internationalist, and anti-establishment politics of populist nationalism implicit in recent
events asbeingphylogenetically related to the classic urbanandprovincialmovements of struggle onehistorically finds
in city-state formations. This move initially seems quite implausible, for how can a state-territory of tens of millions be
likened to a historical city-state that never broke beyond the limits of tens of thousands. However, the technological
developments of the 20th century—media and telecoms revolutions—provide a set of semiotic ligatures that transcend
the physically geographical contours of the urban formation within which historical city-state assemblages have been
limited. The axiomatic city-state is doubtless an abstract concept, but one that is “abstract yet real; ideal yet effective;
absolute yet ‘differentiated’” (Deleuze &Guattari, 2013, p. 255).
I argue thatwith appropriate reconceptualization for the terrain of advanced capitalism, the city-state can be resur-
faced rhizomatically as an inspiration for redefining movements of political struggle. In provincial and metropolitan
terms, these movements conventionally attempt to redefine the relations internal to the state-territory from those of
an “autonomous metropole” to a “bargaining metropole” (Blockmans, 1994, p. 233), normally through the attempt to
“introduce an overarching ideology, calling for an emotional identification by their subjects” (Blockmans, 1994, p. 242).
The problem with the populist nationalist articulation of this politics is that it cleaves to the container of a national
referent and thus continues to labor against historical social forces, the contradictions of whichwill becomemore, and
not less, apparent. The jingoistic mobilization of one-nation Britain and the railing of UKIP ideologues might very well
appeal to an increasingly illusive national referent, but such a politics remains merely the mobilization of a community
of will and not a community of interest, and it will run afoul of the material contradictions in the British state which it
glosses over with such apparent naivety.
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An alternative social-democratic articulation is favored by neo-Keynesians—the reformist confiscation (appro-
priation) of rent and the redistribution of surplus in the name of the generality (Lazzarato, 2015, p. 32). But this
maneuver of decapitation is surely also compromised by the crumbling of the national-social referent, upon which
the historically exceptional post-war social-democratic epoch was legitimated and energized. Likewise, it is also com-
promised historically by social forces that militate against its realization outside the fertile soil of the post-war era. In
the axiomatic city-state, positioned precariously amidst the flows of capital in the world system, there are no dirigible
commanding heights to be seized, the hydra-like assemblage has many heads, and the awesome capitalist powers
summoned from across the empire of capital are likely to be insuperable (just think of the 1976 IMF loan stipulations
forced on the Callaghan government, the coordinations of the European Central Bank, or the powers of News Corp
and the US Treasury). It is also stuck in the planer spatial imaginary of extension, and the container of a societal
referent.
The most promising strategy also happens to be the most radical. It is to undertake a new struggle over axioms
and militate intranationally toward a rearticulated class consciousness in Britain, and not retreat into ethno-
nationalism or social-democratic nostalgia. The contado of the city-state constitutes the terrain of our subordinated
positionality in the city-state; it is our new citizenship, and it produces the cunning ambiguity of our existential
inclusive-exclusion in a new topology of political domination facilitating capital accumulation (Agamben, 1998).
It is to lay siege to the fortified metropolitan positionalities of capture and monopoly rent in the city-state that
we must bend our energies, if we wish to deconstruct, derail, and deterritorialize the sovereign logic of capital
terraforming our state. This is a struggle over surplus capital (Harvey, 2010a, p. 228), entailing an assault upon
the vertices of capture tactically, and upon the city-state assemblage strategically. But such a struggle will not
simplistically pit the superannuated state-territory against the regnant city. Rather, it must draw on a class pol-
itics of struggle by the contadini across the city-state's topography of asymmetric relations in toto, rather than
fall back on ethno-nationalist strategies or classic anti-urban reactions. The reterritorializations of the neolib-
eral global city must be deterritorialized once more, and a new counter-hegemonic war machine released across
the state-territory (Deleuze & Guattari, 2013, p. 487). This is, of course, what we are beginning to see in the
events referenced at the outset. In this assemblage, if “it takes a network to fight a network” (Hardt & Negri,
2005, p. 58), then it also takes counter-engineers to lay siege to its poliorcetic emplacements. Assemblage think-
ing has devoted much energy to strategizing the former (Hardt & Negri, 2017); now it must add the latter to its
arsenal.
Many fear the anti-establishment and anti-metropolitan politics of Scottish National Party, UKIP, and other groups
on the British state-territory. I suspect that populism need not be feared, but it must be engaged. It must certainly
not be dismissed (Müller, 2016). The reflections of Raymond Williams on the challenges that recur for the Left have
once again become highly apposite (Williams, 1976, pp. 86–87), for whom, as for us today, “the political geography
as well as the political sociology of Britain needed quite new kinds of exploration”. It is essential that we break out of
the elitist tone so prevalent today in metropolitan intellectual circles, which has been so favored by English progres-
sives from at least as far back as the Bloomsbury group, that theorizes “in contempt of people, of their hopelessly cor-
rupted state, of their vulgarity and credulity by comparison with an educated minority”. The strategic reappropriation
of populist discourses—that is to say, the “mobilization of the existing resources of ‘the people’ against a naïve or alien
ruling class”—is neither wishful thinking nor reactionary error. It is rather a matter of evading ahistorical and pseudo-
progressive political thought. It is to be remembered that “most ‘Marxist’ movements … grew out of and inherited
and often depended on radical movements of other kinds,” and that “the relation between ‘class’ and ‘nation’ (‘peo-
ple’) proved to be exceptionally complex” (Williams, 1976, p. 86) in the historical praxis of anti-capitalist struggles. The
exordium is clear and simple:
To staywith the existing resources; to learn and perhaps to teach new resources; to live the contradictions and the
options under pressure so that instead of denunciation or writing off there was a chance of understanding them
and tipping them the other way: if these things were populism, then it is as well that the British Left, including
most Marxists, stayed with it. (Williams, 1976, p. 87)
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NOTES
1 A capitalist axiomatic is “a social machine of control and capture,” the axioms of which are not “theoretical proposi-
tions” but the “operative statements that constitute the semiological form of capital and that enter as component parts
into assemblages of production, circulation, and consumption” (Lazzarato, 2015, pp. 147–148; Deleuze & Guattari, 2013,
p. 537).
2 It is this liberal metropolitan social elite thatmost likely voted to remain in the EU on cosmopolitan-internationalist grounds
in the central regions of Greater London.
3 A conjoncture can be understood as a medium-term trend, a “connection between diverse but simultaneous phenomena,”
and can be contrastedwith the structure of the longue durée (see Burke, 1990, pp. 112–113).
4 The term contado (‘county’ in Italian) originates in the Latinate comitatus and alludes to the relatively proximate lands that lie
under the power of an urban centre. Those residing on this land and subjected to this power are contadini.
5 Themeaning of this termwill become apparent below.
6 Such disjunctures includewidening income differentials, class ossifications, divergence ofmetropolitan and provincial social
experiences, divergent housing requirements between classes and generations and the iniquitous distribution of the auster-
ity burden.
7 The state apparatus is that “whole regime of arborescent conjunctions” in the waterworks of a “hydraulic science of govern-
ment” (Deleuze &Guattari, 2013, pp. 484, 423), making of the city-state between fixity and fluidity at once one of the “great
immobile machines,” and a “dynamic vehicular landscape” (Virilio, 2006, p. 31).
8 Courtine (‘curtain’) is a Latinate French term derived from the vocabulary of fortification, and describes an entailing, circum-
ferential wall.
9 The problem of relating time and space through speed (see Virilio, 2006).
10 The Hansa was a league of city-states in the Baltic and North Sea that dominated European trade from the 13th–15th
centuries.
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